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RECENT CASES
COMMERCIAL LAW-UNiFoRm COMAERCIAL CODE-BANK MAY CAN-
CEL LETTER OF CREDIT WITHOUT VERIFYING AccURAcY OF CUSTOMIER'S
AFFIDAVIT
At the request of a corporation, defendant bank issued an irrevocable
letter of credit in favor of plaintiff contractor making scheduled sums of money
available over an eleven month period subject to certain terms and conditions.
The letter of credit provided that the bank could cancel any drawing scheduled
to be available thereunder if more than ten days before the availability date
it received from an officer of the corporation "an affidavit to the effect that one
or more of the events described in" a stated clause of plaintiff's construction
contract "has occurred." Although, undisputedly, none of the described events
had in fact occurred and plaintiff was in no way in default on the construction
contract, the corporation sent to defendant bank an affidavit stating that "one
or more of the events described ... have occurred," and defendant bank notified
plaintiff contractor that the drawing of the final payment under the letter of
credit, otherwise available, was cancelled. The condition expressed in the letter
of credit, unlike the construction contract, was not the occurrence of any of
the described events, but the mere receipt of an affidavit that such events had
occurred. Plaintiff brought an action arising from defendant's failure to make
the final payment under the letter of credit. Defendant appealed from an order
of the Supreme Court at Special Term denying its cross motion for summary
judgmqent. Held, defendant's cross motion for summary judgment granted; the
bank had no legal duty to verify the accuracy of the customer's affidavit.
Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 24 A.D.2d 109, 264 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1st Dep't 1965).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a letter of credit is an engagement
by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer (the buyer) that
the issuer (the bank) will honor drafts or other demands for payment made
by a specified beneficiary (the seller) upon compliance with the conditions
specified in the letter of credit itself.1 Letters of credit have developed principally
as aids to commerce by providing a practical method of financing in the common
situation where a buyer in one locality desires to purchase goods from a seller
in another, and each party desires to protect himself as fully as possible.2 In the
typical transaction, a bank that issues a letter of credit undertakes that it will
pay any draft drawn and negotiated pursuant to its terms. Thus, the bank
merely sells its credit.3 In this respect, it somewhat resembles a contract of
1. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-103(1) (a) (definition of letter of credit).
2. See Shirai v. Blum, 239 N.Y. 172, 146 N.E. 194, 38 A.L.R. 603 (1924); Kingdom of
Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
3. Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E.
272, 56 AL.R. 1186 (1927).
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guaranty. 4 While the letter itself does not possess the necessary attributes of
a negotiable instrument,6 it is similar to a negotiable instrument, 6 because bona
fide purchasers of such drafts will not be subject to equities and defenses that
may be available in an action on the contract out of which the letter of credit
arose. 7 By cancelling a letter of credit before the date of expiration, the issuing
bank commits an anticipatory breach of contract, and becomes liable for
damages caused the beneficiary by reason of the breach.8 The beneficiary has
an immediate right of action for wrongful dishonorY The damages recoverable
by the beneficiary are primarily the face amount of the draft, together with
incidental damages and interest. 10
There are three separate and distinct contracts involved in a letter of credit
transaction-the contract of the bank with its customer whereby it agrees to
issue the letter of credit, the letter of credit itself, and the contract of sale
between the customer of the bank (the buyer) and the beneficiary (the seller).
Except insofar as its terms and conditions are expressly incorporated therein,
and then only to the extent of receipt of documents required by the terms of the
letter itself, the letter of credit is separate and distinct from the contract of
sale between the buyer and seller." The letter of credit constitutes the sole
contract of the issuing bank with the beneficiary.' 2 But the bank has an
obligation to examine those documents specified in the letter of credit 13 to
4. See Evansville Nat'l Bank v. Kaufmann, 93 N.Y. 273, 45 Am. Rep. 204 (1883) (a
letter to a named addressee engaging that any drafts drawn upon a third person were guaran-
teed to be paid at maturity by the writer was described as a letter of credit, although the
case was decided under principles relating solely to contracts of guaranty).
5. Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 634 (Sup. Ct. 1843).
6. Second Nat'l Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 720 (1926).
7. Merchants' Bank v. Griswold, 72 N.Y. 472, 28 Am. Rep. 159 (1878); Courteen
Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272, 56 A.L.R.
1186 (1927).
8. Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st
Dep't), modified on other grounds, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926).
9. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-115(2) provides that "when an issuer wrongfully cancels or other-
wise repudiates a credit before presentment of a draft or demand for payment drawn under
it the beneficiary has the rights of a seller after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under
§ 2-610 if he learns of the repudiation in time reasonably to avoid procurement of the
required documents. Otherwise the beneficiary has an immediate right of action for wrongful
dishonor."
10. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) provides that "when an issuer wrongfully dishonors a
draft or demand for payment presented under a credit the person entitled to honor has with
respect to any documents the rights of a person in the position of a seller . . . and may
recover from the issuer the face amount of the draft or demand together with incidental
damages under Section 2-710 on seller's incidental damages and interest but less any amount
realized by resale or other use or disposition of the subject matter of the transaction. .. ."
11. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925);
Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't),
modified on other grounds, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926) ; Frey & Son, Inc. v. Sherburne
Co., 193 App. Div. 849, 184 N.Y. Supp. 661 (1st Dep't 1920); Kingdom of Sweden v. New York
Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Brown v. C. Rosenstein Co.,
120 Misc. 787, 200 N.Y. Supp. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
12. Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N.Y. Supp.
162 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E. 911 (1921).
13. Camp v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 Atl. 189 (1926).
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determine if they conform to the specifications set forth in the letter of credit.14
The performance of the sales contract between the buyer and seller is not a
condition precedent to performance under the letter of credit or to the buyer's
agreement to reimburse the issuing bank.r The issuing bank has no concern
with any question which may arise between the buyer and the seller of the mer-
chandise for whose purchase price the letter of credit was issued. 10 It is a basic
principle that courts cannot impose upon the parties to a letter of credit any
condition not contained in the letter.17 But courts should avoid a construction
of a letter of credit contract which would place a serious restriction upon
ordinary business methods.18 The fact that a customer who has procured a
letter of credit to facilitate the purchase of goods notifies the issuer that the
goods do not conform to the sales contract requirements and requests the issuer
not to pay a draft drawn thereunder does not change the relationship of the
parties, and the issuer has an obligation to pay the draft if the documents
presented with it fulfill the specific requirements of the letter of credit, leaving
the buyer to his right to bring an appropriate action against the seller.10 The
Uniform Commercial Code recognizes this independent nature of the letter of
credit engagement.20 Thus, the sole measure of the bank's obligation is to be
found in the terms of the letter of credit.2'
In the instant case, the sole issue before the court was whether mere
receipt of the affidavit effectually empowered the bank to cancel the credit
without resulting liability or whether defendant bank owed plaintiff contractor
a duty to investigate the correctness of the asserted violation.2 2 The court
believed that the answer to this question depended upon the independence of
14. Laudisi v. American Exch. Natl Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924); Bank
of New York & Trust Co. v. Atterbury Bros., 226 App. Div. 117, 234 N.Y. Supp. 442
(1st Dep't 1929).
15. Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup.
Ct. 1949).
16. Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 210 App. Div. 179, 205 N.Y. Supp. 446
(1st Dep't 1924); Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188
N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E. 911 (1921).
17. Bank of America v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 291 Fed. 929 (5th Cir. 1923);
Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925); Laudisi
v. American Eich. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924); Atbury Park & Ocean
Grove Bank v. National City Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 268 App. Div.
984, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1st Dep't 1944).
18. Bank of Italy v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 197 App. Div. 150, 188 N.Y. Supp. 183
(4th Dep't 1921).
19. Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924).
20. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) which provides in part that "an issuer must honor a
draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless
of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other
contract between the customer and the beneficiary." Official comment 1 to § 5-114 says that
"the letter of credit . . . is recognized by this Article as independent of the underlying
contract between the customer and the beneficiary."
21. North Woods Paper Mills v. National City Bank, 121 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 283 App. Div. 731, 127 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dep't 1954).
22. The question of irrevocability was not at issue in the instant case. Irrevocable was
held to mean not revocable so long as the conditions specified in the letter of credit were
met.
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the letter of credit contract from the contract of sale between buyer and seller.
Under the contract of sale, the buyer could terminate the credit "on the occur-
rence of any of the events" described in the contract of sale. But the condition
expressed in the letter of credit was the mere receipt of an affidavit containing
an assertion that the event had occurred. The court reasoned that it should
avoid a construction which would place a serious restriction upon ordinary
business methods. A letter of credit is governed by the same general principles
of law as are all other contracts in writing. 23 Thus, letters of credit must receive
a reasonable construction having regard to the intent of the parties and the
circumstances,24 and the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by a con-
sideration of the terms of the letter as construed in the light of its purpose and
the circumstances attending its execution. 25 As between the issuer and the bene-
ficiary of a letter of credit, it has been held that since the letter was prepared
by the issuer, it is necessary to take the words in the letter as strongly against
the issuer as a reasonable reading would justify.2 6 But the bank should not
have to assume the burden of determining the accuracy of the representation
for this would cause an undue hardship on the bank. On this ground, the
Appellate Division held that the letter of credit was, on its face, a complete
statement of the obligations owed by the bank to the beneficiary. Therefore,
said the court, since the letter of credit was independent of the sales contract
between buyer and seller, the mere presentation of an affidavit by the customer
was sufficient justification for the bank to refuse payment to the beneficiary.
There is surprisingly little decisional law in the field of letters of credit,
especially in view of the vast amount of money and the vast number of trans-
actions which take place in this field.27 In almost no state outside of New York
is there a comprehensive and cohesive body of common law dealing with letters
of credit. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, letters of
credit transactions were handled by only a handful of American banks, 28 despite
their usefulness in many different commercial situations where the parties did
business in different localities. By codifying the law on this subject, the Uniform
Commercial Code has done much to make this useful tool more readily available
to a wider segment of the business community. The instant case illustrates a
typical letter of credit problem. In coming to a just solution of a situation not
explicitly dealt with by the statute, the court must consider public policy. It
could be argued that since plaintiff contractor did not breach the sales contract,
it should be entitled to receive the final payment from the bank under the letter
23. See Bank of United States v. Seltzer, 233 App. Div. 225, 251 N.Y. Supp. 637 (1st
Dep't 1931).
24. Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div. 25, 208 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925).
25. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
26. Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div. 25, 208 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925); Bank of Italy v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 197
App. Div. 150, 188 N.Y. Supp. 183 (4th Dep't 1921).
27. See Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 Cornell L.Q. 92 (1962).
28. See 1 Bogert, Britton, & Hawkland, Sales and Securities 340 (4th ed. 1962).
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of credit. But using a better approach, the court has reached a result in
line with commercial practice. Often the bank and the beneficiary are geograph-
ically distant. The bank, draftsman of its own obligation, undertook to make
payment upon demand unless it received notice to the contrary from its customer
that the beneficiary had not fulfilled its underlying obligation. It would be too
much to ask that the bank investigate to determine if the beneficiary had, in
fact, failed to perform each condition of its obligation. Distance and expense
would make such a requirement prohibitive. Furthermore, the problem in this
case might, in all likelihood, have been caused by carelessness on the part of
plaintiff or its lawyer in failing to note the difference between the condition as
expressed in the sales contract and in the letter of credit. If plaintiff had been
aware of the existence of the discrepancy, it ought to have insisted that it be
rectified. Since the bank performed exactly what it had promised to do, it
would appear that the court was correct in holding for the bank in this situation.
CHARLES E. MILCH
CONFLICT OF LAWS-NEw Yopx LAW APPLIED TO BANK ACCOUNT
OF MARRIED FORE GN Do IcL tmd s
The Duke and Duchess of Arion, nationals and domiciliaries of Spain,
sent cash and securities to New York for safekeeping and investment during
the years of Spanish political uncertainty from 1919 to the end of the Civil
War. In establishing joint custodial accounts with several New York banks,
the husband and wife signed standard bank survivorship agreement forms valid
under New York law,' but void under the community property law of Spain.
2
In one account, the agreement expressly provided that the rights of all parties
would be governed by New York law. The husband died in 1957, the wife in
1959. Neither had ever been in New York. After the husband's death, the
wife assumed control of the property (nearly 2 million dollars) in New York
and undertook to dispose of it by a will executed according to New York
law.3 Plaintiff, as the husband's ancillary administrator in New York, sued
defendant, individually and as executor of the wife's will, to establish title to
one-half the property in New York, which, plaintiff claimed, became part of
the husband's estate under the community property law of Spain.4 After trial,
the complaint was dismissed on the merits. The Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed without opinion.6 The Court of Appeals affirmed 4 to 3. Held, that
when married foreigners place property in New York for safekeeping and
1. N.Y. Banking Law § 134(3).
2. See Spanish Civil Code arts. 1334, 1394.
3. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 47.
4. See Spanish Civil Code arts. 1424, 1426.
S. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
6. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 22 AMD.2d 853, 254 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
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